Fiscal stimulus as an optimal control problem

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Philip A Ernst, Michael B Imerman, Larry Shepp, Quan Zhou

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.46 Monetary policy

Thông tin xuất bản: 2014

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí

ID: 161414

 During the Great Recession, Democrats in the United States argued that government spending could be utilized to "grease the wheels" of the economy in order to create wealth and to increase employment
  Republicans, on the other hand, contended that government spending is wasteful and discouraged investment, thereby increasing unemployment. Today, in 2020, we find ourselves in the midst of another crisis where government spending and fiscal stimulus is again being considered as a solution. In the present paper, we address this question by formulating an optimal control problem generalizing the model of Radner & Shepp (1996). The model allows for the company to borrow continuously from the government. We prove that there exists an optimal strategy
  rigorous verification proofs for its optimality are provided. We proceed to prove that government loans increase the expected net value of a company. We also examine the consequences of different profit-taking behaviors among firms who receive fiscal stimulus.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH