Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present

• Tác giả: N Packham
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 636.081 Selection, showing, ownership marks
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2018
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 161743

Tóm tắt

 In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output
  this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and -under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. We show that this result continues to hold when in addition reservation utilities are type-dependent. This type of problem occurs in the study of optimal compensation problems involving competing principals.