Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics

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Tác giả: Shijian Li, Zhijian Wang, Li Zhang, Nan Zhou

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 338.5 General production economics

Thông tin xuất bản: 2018

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Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 161800

 Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept in current artificial intelligence age. Whether algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algorithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extorted its human rival and gets higher profit in long run, meanwhile the human rival will fully collude with the algorithm. As a result, the social welfare declines rapidly and stably. Both in theory and in experiment, our work confirms that, algorithmic collusion can be a creditable threat. In application, we hope, the frameworks, the algorithm design as well as the experiment environment illustrated in this work, can be an incubator or a test bed for researchers and policymakers to handle the emerging algorithmic collusion.Comment: 22 pages, 7 figures
  algorithmic collusion
  Cournot duopoly model
  experimental economics
  game theory
  collusion algorithm design
  iterated prisoner's dilemma
  antitrust
  mechanism design
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