A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets

• Tác giả: Vasco Medici, Lorenzo Nespoli, Matteo Salani
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 330 Economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2018
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 161977

Tóm tắt

We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by means of numerical simulations.