Strictly strategy-proof auctions

• Tác giả: Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 018.3 +Catalogs arranged by author, main entry, date, or register number
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2018
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 162110

Tóm tắt

A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.