Long-run Consequences of Health Insurance Promotion When Mandates are Not Enforceable: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Patrick Asuming, Hyuncheol Bryant Kim, Armand Sim

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 966.7 *Ghana

Thông tin xuất bản: 2018

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 162407

We study long-run selection and treatment effects of a health insurance subsidy in Ghana, where mandates are not enforceable. We randomly provide different levels of subsidy (1/3, 2/3, and full), with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. We find that a one-time subsidy promotes and sustains insurance enrollment for all treatment groups, but long-run health care service utilization increases only for the partial subsidy groups. We find evidence that selection explains this pattern: those who were enrolled due to the subsidy, especially the partial subsidy, are more ill and have greater health care utilization.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH