Cartel Stability under Quality Differentiation

• Tác giả: Iwan Bos, Marco Marini
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 381.4 Specific products and services
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2018
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 162495

Tóm tắt

Comment: 17 pages, including 3 additional AppendicesThis note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small.