Relational Communication

• Tác giả: Anton Kolotilin, Hongyi Li
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 158.2 Interpersonal relations
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 162560

Tóm tắt

Comment: 48 pages, 4 figuresWe study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling extreme states where she is most tempted to defect.