Conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay

• Tác giả: Eduardo Alvarado-Santos, Benjamin A Itza-Ortiz, Raul Villafuerte-Segura
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 330 Economics
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 162874

Tóm tắt

Comment: Major revision performed, includes title change and correction of some proofs. 14 pages, 1 figureWe provide conditions for stable equilibrium in Cournot duopoly models with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that our conditions actually imply asymptotically stable equilibrium and delay independence. Conditions include the same marginal cost and equal probability for evading taxes. We give examples of cost and inverse demand functions satisfying the proposed conditions. Some economic interpretations of our results are also included.