On the many-to-one strongly stable fractional matching set

• Tác giả: Pablo A Neme, Jorge Oviedo
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 512.74 Algebraic number theory
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 162949

Tóm tắt

For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and $\boldsymbol{q}$-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of stable matchings. Also, we prove that a strongly stable fractional matching is represented as a convex combination of stable matchings that are ordered in the common preferences of all firms.