A Model of Presidential Debates

• Tác giả: Doron Klunover, John Morgan
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 308.5 [Unassigned]
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 163066

Tóm tắt

Presidential debates are viewed as providing an important public good by revealing information on candidates to voters. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in which an incumbent and a challenger (who is privately informed about her own quality) publicly announce whether they are willing to participate in a public debate, taking into account that a voter's choice of candidate depends on her beliefs regarding the candidates' qualities and on the state of nature.It is found that in equilibrium a debate occurs or does not occur independently of the challenger's quality and therefore the candidates' announcements are uninformative. This is because opting-out is perceived to be worse than losing a debate and therefore the challenger never refuses to participate.