Empirical strategy-proofness

• Tác giả: Alexander L Brown, Rodrigo A Velez
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 146.42 Logical positivism (Logical empiricism)
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 163142

Tóm tắt

We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019, arXiv:1804.07986) we determine that this behavior is plausible only when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition and information is not interior. Analysis of the accumulated experimental and empirical evidence on these games supports our findings.