Open shop scheduling games

• Tác giả: Ata Atay, Pedro Calleja, Sergio Soteras
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 796.35266 Ball games
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 163154

Tóm tắt

This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of operations) to a different player, we can construct a cooperative TU-game associated with any open shop scheduling problem. We assign to each coalition the maximal cost savings it can obtain through admissible rearrangements of jobs' operations. By providing a core allocation, we show that the associated games are balanced. Finally, we relax the definition of admissible rearrangements for a coalition to study to what extend balancedness still holds.