Realistic versus Rational Secret Sharing

• Tác giả: Yvo Desmedt, Arkadii Slinko
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 149.2 Realism
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 163247

Tóm tắt

Comment: This is a preliminary version of a paper accepted for GameSec 2019The study of Rational Secret Sharing initiated by Halpern and Teague regards the reconstruction of the secret in secret sharing as a game. It was shown that participants (parties) may refuse to reveal their shares and so the reconstruction may fail. Moreover, a refusal to reveal the share may be a dominant strategy of a party. In this paper we consider secret sharing as a sub-action or subgame of a larger action/game where the secret opens a possibility of consumption of a certain common good. We claim that utilities of participants will be dependent on the nature of this common good. In particular, Halpern and Teague scenario corresponds to a rivalrous and excludable common good. We consider the case when this common good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and find many natural Nash equilibria. We list several applications of secret sharing to demonstrate our claim and give corresponding scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples.