Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids

• Tác giả: Nathalie Gimenes, Emmanuel Guerre
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 003.1 System identification
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 163517

Tóm tắt

This paper introduces a version of the interdependent value model of Milgrom and Weber (1982), where the signals are given by an index gathering signal shifters observed by the econometrician and private ones specific to each bidders. The model primitives are shown to be nonparametrically identified from first-price auction bids under a testable mild rank condition. Identification holds for all possible signal values. This allows to consider a wide range of counterfactuals where this is important, as expected revenue in second-price auction. An estimation procedure is briefly discussed.