Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules

• Tác giả: Mostapha Diss, Boris Tsvelikhovskiy
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 302.13 Social choice
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2019
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 163628

Tóm tắt

Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The present paper is devoted to study coalitional manipulability within the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any number of alternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing to characterize all the outcomes that can be manipulable by a coalition of voters. This gives us the possibility to find the probability of manipulable outcomes for some well-studied scoring voting rules in case of small number of alternatives and large electorates under a well-known assumption on individual preference profiles.