The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse

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Tác giả: Matata Ponyo Mapon, Jean-Paul K Tsasa

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 333.713 Economics of land and energy

Thông tin xuất bản: 2019

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí

ID: 163637

 Comment: in FrenchThis paper reexamines the validity of the natural resource curse hypothesis, using the database of mineral exporting countries. Our findings are as follows: (i) Resource-rich countries (RRCs) do not necessarily exhibit poor political, economic and social performance
  (ii) RRCs that perform poorly have a low diversified exports portfolio
  (iii) In contrast, RRCs with a low diversified exports portfolio do not necessarily perform poorly. Then, we develop a model of strategic interaction from a Bayesian game setup to study the role of leadership and governance in the management of natural resources. We show that an improvement in the leadership-governance binomial helps to discipline the behavior of lobby groups (theorem 1) and generate a Pareto improvement in the management of natural resources (theorem 2). Evidence from the World Bank Group's CPIA data confirms the later finding. Our results remain valid after some robustness checks.
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