The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference

• Tác giả: Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Surekha Rao
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 302.13 Social choice
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 163949

Tóm tắt

Comment: JEL Code: D71We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.