A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity

• Tác giả: Stuart Harwood, Dimitri J Papageorgiou, Francisco Trespalacios
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 164037

Tóm tắt

Comment: 4 pagesDiscretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.