Game Theoretic Consequences of Resident Matching

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Tác giả: Yue Wu

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory

Thông tin xuất bản: 2020

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 164091

The resident matching algorithm, Gale-Shapley, currently used by SF Match and the National Residency Match Program (NRMP), has been in use for over 50 years without fundamental alteration. The algorithm is a 'stable-marriage' method that favors applicant outcomes. However, in these 50 years, there has been a big shift in the supply and demand of applicants and programs. These changes along with the way the Match is implemented have induced a costly race among applicants to apply and interview at as many programs as possible. Meanwhile programs also incur high costs as they maximize their probability of matching by interviewing as many candidates as possible.
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