Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information

• Tác giả: Gilad Bavly, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 362.9 Historical, geographic, persons treatment
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 164753

Tóm tắt

Comment: 34 pages main text (including 9 figures) + 14 pages of appendices + bibliographyWe consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.