Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Lin Hu, Anqi Li

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 324.6 Election systems and procedures; suffrage

Thông tin xuất bản: 2020

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 165163

We study a model of electoral accountability and selection whereby heterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data into personalized signals through paying limited attention. Extreme voters' signals exhibit an own-party bias, which hampers their ability to discern the good and bad performances of the incumbent. While this effect alone would undermine electoral accountability and selection, there is a countervailing effect stemming from partisan disagreement, which makes the centrist voter more likely to be pivotal. In case the latter's unbiased signal is very informative about the incumbent's performance, the combined effect on electoral accountability and selection can actually be a positive one. For this reason, factors that carry a negative connotation in every political discourse -- such as increasing mass polarization and shrinking attention span -- have ambiguous accountability and selection effects in general. Correlating voters' signals, if done appropriately, unambiguously improves electoral accountability and selection and, hence, voter welfare.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH