Strategy-proof allocation with outside option

• Tác giả: Jun Zhang
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 359.43 Sea forces and warfare
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 165184

Tóm tắt

Comment: 35 pagesStrategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for several existing results in distinct models and imply new results in some models. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down every agent's probability of choosing his outside option is equivalent to pinning down a mechanism. The second result provides a sufficient condition for two strategy-proof mechanisms to be equivalent when the number of possible allocations is finite.