A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

• Tác giả: Agustin G Bonifacio, Elena Inarra, Pablo Neme
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 165255

Tóm tắt

Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.