Selling two complementary goods

• Tác giả: Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 658.85 Personal selling
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 165582

Tóm tắt

A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of the agent. In this two-dimensional type space model, we characterize the incentive constraints and show that the optimal (expected revenue-maximizing) mechanism is a ratio-dependent posted price or a posted price mechanism for a class of distributions. We also show that the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism when the value and the ratio are independently distributed.Comment: Minor revisions