Screening for breakthroughs

• Tác giả: Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 616.975075 Other diseases
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 165642

Tóm tắt

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.