Persuading a Wishful Thinker

• Tác giả: Victor Augias, Daniel M. A Barreto
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 154.3 Daydreams, fantasies, reveries
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2020
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 165676

Tóm tắt

We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is systematically overoptimistic about the most favorable outcomes. We show that wishful thinking can lead to a qualitative shift in the structure of optimal persuasion compared to the Bayesian case, whenever the sender is uncertain about what the receiver perceives as the best-case outcome in his decision problem.