Comment: 7 pages, 3 figuresThe problem of pricing utility-scale energy storage resources (ESRs) in the real-time electricity market is considered. Under a rolling-window dispatch model where the operator centrally dispatches generation and consumption under forecasting uncertainty, it is shown that almost all uniform pricing schemes, including the standard locational marginal pricing (LMP), result in lost opportunity costs that require out-of-the-market settlements. It is also shown that such settlements give rise to disincentives for generating firms and storage participants to bid truthfully, even when these market participants are rational price-takers in a competitive market. Temporal locational marginal pricing (TLMP) is proposed for ESRs as a generalization of LMP to an in-market discriminative form. TLMP is a sum of the system-wide energy price, LMP, and the individual state-of-charge price. It is shown that, under arbitrary forecasting errors, the rolling-window implementation of TLMP eliminates the lost opportunity costs and provides incentives to price-taking firms to bid truthfully with their marginal costs. Numerical examples show insights into the effects of uniform and non-uniform pricing mechanisms on dispatch following and truthful bidding incentives.