When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers

• Tác giả: Kiho Yoon
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 643.12 Selecting, buying, selling homes
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2021
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 166963

Tóm tắt

We study the problem of when to sell an indivisible object. There is a monopolistic seller who owns an indivisible object and plans to sell it over a given span of time to the set of potential buyers whose valuations for the object evolve over time. We formulate the seller's problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. We provide a procedure for finding the optimal solution and show how to check incentive compatibility. We also discuss the threshold rule from the perspective of optimal stopping.