Characterization of equilibrium existence and purification in general Bayesian games

• Tác giả: Wei He, Xiang Sun, Yeneng Sun, Yishu Zeng
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2021
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 167192

Tóm tắt

This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition is both sufficient and necessary for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria and purification from behavioral strategies. As a consequence of our purification method, a new existence result on pure-strategy equilibria is also obtained for discontinuous Bayesian games. Illustrative applications of our results to oligopolistic competitions and all-pay auctions are provided.