Risk sharing under heterogeneous beliefs without convexity

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Tác giả: Felix-Benedikt Liebrich

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory

Thông tin xuất bản: 2021

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Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 167608

We consider the problem of finding Pareto-optimal allocations of risk among finitely many agents. The associated individual risk measures are law invariant, but with respect to agent-dependent and potentially heterogeneous reference probability measures. Moreover, we assume that the individual risk assessments are consistent with the respective second-order stochastic dominance relations. We do not assume their convexity though. A simple sufficient condition for the existence of Pareto optima is provided. The proof combines local comonotone improvement with a Dieudonn\'e-type argument, which also establishes a link of the optimal allocation problem to the realm of "collapse to the mean" results. Finally, we extend the results to capital requirements with multidimensional security markets.
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