Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

• Tác giả: Saurav Goyal, Aroon Narayanan
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 973.92 1953—2001
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2021
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 167665

Tóm tắt

Comment: 17 pagesWe characterize ex-post implementable allocation rules for single object auctions under quasi-linear preferences with convex interdependent value functions. We show that requiring ex-post implementability is equivalent to requiring that the allocation rule must satisfy a condition that we call eventual monotonicity (EM), which is a weakening of monotonicity, a familiar condition used to characterize dominant strategy implementation.