Matching Markets

• Tác giả: Ivan Villa-Renteria, Bruce Changlong Xu, Andrew Yang
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 658.8 Management of marketing
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2021
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 167909

Tóm tắt

Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and determine these distributions efficiently. Although it has been shown that finding market clearing prices for Fisher markets with indivisible goods is NP-hard, there exist polynomial-time algorithms able to compute these prices and allocations when the goods are divisible and the utility functions are linear. We provide a promising research direction toward the development of a market that simulates buyers' preferences that vary according to the bundles of goods allocated to other buyers. Our research aims to elucidate unique ways in which the theory of matching markets can be extended to account for more complex and often counterintuitive microeconomic phenomena.