Free Riding in Networks

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Tác giả: Markus Kinateder, Luca Paolo Merlino

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 003.72 Systems

Thông tin xuất bản: 2021

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 168057

 Players allocate their budget to links, a local public good and a private good. A player links to free ride on others' public good provision. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, large contributors link to each other, while others link to them. Poorer players can be larger contributors if linking costs are sufficiently high. In large societies, free riding reduces inequality only in networks in which it is initially low
  otherwise, richer players benefit more, as they can afford more links. Finally, we study the policy implications, deriving income redistribution that increases welfare and personalized prices that implement the efficient solution.
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