Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings

• Tác giả: Agustin G Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 576.84 Evolutionary cycles
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2021
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 168059

Tóm tắt

In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in preferences" and generalizes the algorithm presented in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for the one-to-one model.