Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets

• Tác giả: Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 302.13 Social choice
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2021
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 168204

Tóm tắt

Comment: 47 pagesWe explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.