Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information

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Tác giả: Bernhard Kasberger, Kyle Woodward

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 018.3 +Catalogs arranged by author, main entry, date, or register number

Thông tin xuất bản: 2021

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Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 168421

 We study multi-unit auctions in which bidders have limited knowledge of opponent strategies and values. We characterize optimal prior-free bids
  these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. Optimal bids are readily computable despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information, and in certain cases admit closed-form solutions. In the pay-as-bid auction the minimax-loss bid is unique
  in the uniform-price auction the minimax-loss bid is unique if the bidder is allowed to determine the quantities for which they bid, as in many practical applications. We compare minimax-loss bids and auction outcomes across auction formats, and derive testable predictions.
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