Robust Private Supply of a Public Good

• Tác giả: Wanchang Zhang
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 363.6 Public utilities and related services
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2022
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 168505

Tóm tắt

 Comment: This paper uses methodologies similar to arXiv:2105.05427 to study public good mechanismsWe study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows the expectations of the agents' values, but does not know the joint distribution of the values. The principal evaluates a mechanism by the worst-case expected revenue over joint distributions that are consistent with the known expectations. We characterize maxmin public good mechanisms among dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms for the two-agent case and for a special $N$-agent ($N>
 2$) case.