Observational Learning with Competitive Prices

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Zikai Xu

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 156.315 Comparative psychology

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 194403

 Will people eventually learn the value of an asset through observable information? This paper studies observational learning in a market with competitive prices. Comparing a market with public signals and a market with private signals in a sequential trading model, we find that Pairwise Informativeness (PI) is the sufficient and necessary learning condition for a market with public signals
  and Avery and Zemsky Condition (AZC) is the sufficient and necessary learning condition for a market with private signals. Moreover, when the number of states is 2 or 3, PI and AZC are equivalent. And when the number of states is greater than 3, PI and Monotonic Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) together imply asymptotic learning in the private signal case.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH