Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), Disintermediation and Financial Privacy: The Case of the Bahamian Sand Dollar

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Tác giả: Kilian Wenker

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 332.11 Central banks

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí

ID: 194861

Comment: 30 pages, 5 figures, 2 tablesThe fast-growing, market-driven demand for cryptocurrencies worries central banks, as their monetary policy could be completely undermined. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could offer a solution, yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. This non-technical paper examines how The Bahamas has designed the Sand Dollar, the first real-world instance of a retail CBDC. It contrasts the Sand Dollar with definition-based specifications. I then develop a scenario analysis to illustrate commercial bank risks. In this process, the central bank becomes a deposit monopolist, leading to high funding risks, disintermediation risks, and solvency risks for the com-mercial banking sector. I argue that restrictions and caps will be the new specifications of a regulatory framework for CBDCs if disintermediation in the banking sector is to be prevented. I identify the anonymity of CBDCs as a comparative disadvantage that will affect their adoption. These findings provide insight into governance problems facing central banks, and coherently lead to the design of the Sand Dollar. I conclude by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC.
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