The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

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Tác giả: Thilo Klein, Josue Ortega

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 379.3 Public policy issues in private education

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 194939

We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.
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