A Market for Trading Forecasts: A Wagering Mechanism

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Tác giả: Sergio Grammatico, Jalal Kazempour, Pierre Pinson, Aitazaz Ali Raja

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 551.63 Weather forecasting and forecasts, reporting and reports

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 195082

In many areas of industry and society, e.g., energy, healthcare, logistics, agents collect vast amounts of data that they deem proprietary. These data owners extract predictive information of varying quality and relevance from data depending on quantity, inherent information content, and their own technical expertise. Aggregating these data and heterogeneous predictive skills, which are distributed in terms of ownership, can result in a higher collective value for a prediction task. In this paper, we envision a platform for improving predictions via implicit pooling of private information in return for possible remuneration. Specifically, we design a wagering-based forecast elicitation market platform, where a buyer intending to improve their forecasts posts a prediction task, and sellers respond to it with their forecast reports and wagers. This market delivers an aggregated forecast to the buyer (pre-event) and allocates a payoff to the sellers (post-event) for their contribution. We propose a payoff mechanism and prove that it satisfies several desirable economic properties, including those specific to electronic platforms. Furthermore, we discuss the properties of the forecast aggregation operator and scoring rules to emphasize their effect on the sellers' payoff. Finally, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the structure and properties of the proposed market platform.
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