The Limits of Limited Commitment

• Tác giả: Jacopo Bizzotto, Toomas Hinnosaar, Adrien Vigier
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 121.2 Possibility and limits of knowledge
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2022
• Bộ sưu tập: Metadata
• ID: 195122

Tóm tắt

We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and elicit the commitment structures leading to consumer- and producer-optimal outcomes.