Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Roberto Corrao, Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 153.85 Modification of will

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 195458

In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach to the receiver's problem. A signal is optimal iff the induced joint distribution over states and actions is supported on a compact set (the contact set) where the dual constraint binds. A signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and such pairwise signals are the only solutions under a non-singularity condition on utilities (the twist condition). We provide conditions under which higher actions are induced at more or less extreme pairs of states. Finally, we provide conditions for the optimality of either full disclosure or negative assortative disclosure, where signal realizations can be ordered from least to most extreme. Optimal negative assortative disclosure is characterized as the solution to a pair of ordinary differential equations.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH