Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision

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Tác giả: Huiyi Guo, Wei He, Bin Liu

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 153.15 Learning

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 195678

 Comment: 44 pagesWe study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his first-stage consumption level. Consuming more leads to a more precise valuation estimate, after which the buyer determines the second-stage consumption level. The optimum is a menu of try-and-decide contracts, consisting of a first-stage price-quantity pair and a second-stage per-unit price for the remaining quantity. In equilibrium, a higher first-stage valuation buyer pays more for higher first-stage consumption and enjoys a lower second-stage per-unit price. Methodologically, we deal with the difficulty that due to the failure of single-crossing condition, monotonicity in allocation plus the envelope condition is insufficient for incentive compatibility. Our results help to understand contracts about sequential consumption with the learning feature
  e.g., leasing contracts for experience goods and trial sessions for certain courses.
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