Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Tamás Solymosi

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 519.3 Game theory

Thông tin xuất bản: 2022

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 196004

Comment: 20 pagesWe characterize the assignment games which admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) in terms of efficiently verifiable structural properties of the nonnegative matrix that induces the game. We prove that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if the positive elements of the underlying nonnegative matrix form orthogonal submatrices of three special types. In game theoretic terms it means that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if it contains a veto player or a dominant veto mixed pair or is composed of from these two types of special assignment games. We also show that in a PMAS-admissible assignment game all core allocations can be extended to a PMAS, and the nucleolus coincides with the tau-value.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH