School Choice with Farsighted Students

• Tác giả: Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• Ký hiệu phân loại: 612.84 Eyes
• Thông tin xuất bản: 2022
• Bộ sưu tập: Báo, Tạp chí
• ID: 196230

Tóm tắt

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.