Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting

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Tác giả: Haris Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen, Toby Walsh

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 324.6 Election systems and procedures; suffrage

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 196547

Comment: Appears in the 19th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2023The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.
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