Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences

 0 Người đánh giá. Xếp hạng trung bình 0

Tác giả: Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo, Marc Vorsatz

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 003.56 Decision theory

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 196575

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barber\`a and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.
Tạo bộ sưu tập với mã QR

THƯ VIỆN - TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC CÔNG NGHỆ TP.HCM

ĐT: (028) 36225755 | Email: tt.thuvien@hutech.edu.vn

Copyright @2024 THƯ VIỆN HUTECH