How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?

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Tác giả: Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Nicholas Wu

Ngôn ngữ: eng

Ký hiệu phân loại: 018.3 +Catalogs arranged by author, main entry, date, or register number

Thông tin xuất bản: 2023

Mô tả vật lý:

Bộ sưu tập: Metadata

ID: 196939

 We present a model of digital advertising with three key features: (i) advertisers can reach consumers on and off a platform, (ii) additional data enhances the value of advertiser-consumer matches, and (iii) bidding follows auction-like mechanisms. We contrast data-augmented auctions, which leverage the platform's data advantage to improve match quality, and managed campaign mechanisms that automate match formation and price-setting. The platform-optimal mechanism is a managed campaign that conditions on-platform prices for sponsored products on the off-platform prices set by all advertisers. This mechanism yields the efficient on-platform allocation but inefficient off-platform allocations due to high product prices
  it attains the vertical integration profit for the platform and advertisers
  and it increases off-platform product prices and decreases consumer surplus, relative to data-augmented auctions.
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